Debtor D (we’ll call him “D,” for short) owes you tens of thousands of dollars for product that you delivered months ago. When you inquire as to what the delay is in receiving payment, you get a run-around, and ultimately find out that D’s company was taken over by a small, closely held company whose priorities clearly do not include paying your bills.  By now, you’ve put them on formal notice that unless D pays the bills in full, a breach of contract suit will be brought.

Recognizing that he will have no viable defense to your claim, the principal of D does what many short-sighted executives do: he divests the company of as many assets as possible, as quickly as possible, transferring properties into the name of his wife and other family members for little or no consideration. While many people in your situation would throw up their hands at this point, that may prove to be a terrible mistake. And that is because they are likely unaware of the doctrine of constructive fraud – the cousin of the alter ego/piercing the corporate veil doctrine.

Unlike common law fraud principles, which require a showing of intent to defraud (which is difficult to prove), New York’s Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (‘UFCA’), as codified in Article 10 of the Debtor and Creditor Law at §§ 270-281, has several provisions that do not require a claimant to prove that the defendant had actual intent to commit a fraud, and some of these provisions, such as section 273-a (entitled “Conveyances by
defendants”), was specifically drafted to prevent debtors from escaping their obligations in a lawsuit. This doctrine is commonly referred to as “constructive fraud.”

There is one important catch, however: in New York, as in other jurisdictions, “[A] transfer may not be challenged as fraudulent unless it prejudices the complaining creditor.” In other words, in determining whether a creditor has been prejudiced, courts consider what rights, if any, the creditor would have had to levy on the property had the challenged conveyance not occurred. And if the creditor (i.e., you) would never have been able to recover any of that money because your claim was so far back in line of the creditors, you will still be out of luck.

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In this case, the plaintiff sued to recover damages against her alarm company following a burglary.  At one point during the contract period, Firstline was acquired by ADT, a large home security alarm company. The Court’s decision which dismissed the claims against the defendants is significant for two (2) reasons:

1. The Court held that “courts applying New York law will enforce a shortened statute of limitations when it is reasonable and agreed to by contract.” (The Court also noted that reducing the claim period to one year is not unreasonable as a matter of law.) See, e.g., Cab Associates v. City of New York, 32 A.D.3d 229, 323, 820 N.Y.S.2d 21 (N.Y. 2006); and,
2. As a general rule, a party may not invoke the provisions of a contract to which it is not an original party. There are limited exceptions to this rule, however,  which include the following theories: (1) assumption;  (2) piercing the corporate veil or alter ego; (3)  incorporation by reference; (4) third-party beneficiary theories; or, (5) waiver [or] estoppel. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S.Ct. 1896, 1902, 173 L.Ed.2d 832 (2009).

Here, the Court held that “assumption” was applicable.  Since the original Alarm Services Contract with Firstline Security Inc. specified that any lawsuit be brought within one year of the event that causing loss, damage or liability, ADT was also entitled to the benefit of that contractual provision, rendering plaintiff’s claim untimely.

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