But is that fear grounded in reality?

The short answer under New York law, as you might well guess, is that it depends on whether you have a formal written severance agreement, and if so, what the agreement says. For example, in a July 1 decision in Coastal Sheet Metal Corp. v. Vassallo, New York’s Appellate Division, First Department held that the plaintiff’s former CEO had forfeited his right to his severance package because “the [trial] court’s finding that [defendant] breached his employment agreement by ‘violat[ing] the trust of his position’ negates [his] claim for severance, as a matter of law.”

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Reading this decision, I can’t say I’m surprised; simply put, the plaintiff had absolutely no proof to support its claims other than rank speculation.

As the Appellate Court stated:

“This argument has no support in the record, which indicates that Tapestry approached defendant about joining its company after plaintiff rejected the partnership proposal. There is no evidence, other than plaintiff’s speculation, that defendant was negotiating during the two companies’ ultimately fruitless discussions (see Abrahami v UPC Constr. Co., 224 AD2d 231, 233 [1996] [fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence; "loose, equivocal or contradictory" evidence will not suffice] …

“The court properly dismissed the claim alleging that defendant acted as a faithless employee because there is no evidence that defendant was negotiating for his new position with Tapestry during the pendency of the business discussions between Tapestry and plaintiff. Nor is there any support for plaintiff’s contention that defendant was making use of confidential information while negotiating his employment with Tapestry.”

In fact, after reading this decision, and given how emphatic the appellate court’s opinion is, I can’t help but wonder: why did the plaintiff even bother appealing (or even bringing the claim in the first instance)?

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The difficulties with this type of claim do not end there.

In many instances, the parties have executed a detailed agreement that contains a disclaimer stating that the purchaser is not relying upon any of the seller representations, which often will sound the death knell to any claim that the plaintiff/purchaser reasonably relied upon the seller’s representations. “[W]here a party specifically disclaims reliance upon a representation in a contract, that party cannot, in a subsequent action for fraud, assert it was fraudulently induced to enter into the contract by the very representation it has disclaimed.” Grumman Allied Indus. Inc. v. Rohr Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 729, 734-35 (2d Cir. 1984); see also, Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 NY2d 317 (1959).

Not surprisingly, there are exceptions to this rule as well, such as where the concealment pertains to matters that were exclusively within the defendants’ knowledge, and could only have been discovered by the plaintiff through great difficulty (this topic will hopefully be the subject of a separate article that I intend to publish shortly).

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In CBL Path, Inc. v. Lexington Insurance Co., the plaintiff was confronted with an obvious negligence situation – their laboratory mixed up test results, causing a woman to undergo what was otherwise an unnecessary double mastectomy. Although their malpractice policy carried limits of $1 million, the defendant, a subsidiary of AIG, apparently never contacted the claimant to conduct any pre-litigation settlement negotiations, and as a result, the claimant ultimately filed suit, which brought a great deal of negative publicity to CBL.

CBL then sued its insurer for damage to its business reputation, lost profits, as well as the lost business opportunities that were directly caused by the negative publicity that it suffered due to the filing of the underlying negligence action.

Ultimately, and predictably, the Court was constrained to dismiss the action, following New York’s legal precedent, which the Court summarized as follows:

“Since an award of damages exceeding the policy limits is punitive in nature, it “is not applied routinely for breach of contract; and bad faith requires an extraordinary showing of a disingenuous or dishonest failure to carry out a contract …

“Since courts are understandably reluctant to expose insurers to liability exceeding the policy limits, the bad faith must be for conduct that is clearly more than ordinary negligence, i.e., more than merely poor judgment.”

The Court then articulated the rare circumstance under which an insurer can be held liable in bad faith in New York:

“Naturally, proof that a demand for settlement was made is a prerequisite to a bad-faith action for failure to settle. [Additionally,] the plaintiff in a bad-faith action must show that the insured lost an actual opportunity to settle the . . . claim at a time when all serious doubts about the insured’s liability were removed.

“Bad faith is established only where the liability is clear and the potential recovery far exceeds the insurance coverage” (id. at 454 [internal quotations marks and citations omitted]; see also Smith v General Acc. Ins. Co., 91 NY2d 648, 653; Soto v State Farm Ins. Co., 83 NY2d 718, 723; Vecchione v Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 274 AD2d 576, 578; cf. United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v Copfer, 48 NY2d 871, 873).”

Needless to say, I find this rule disturbing, because it tacitly allows insurers to ignore their fiduciary duties to their insureds – without any fear of adverse consequence. To borrow an old phrase, “There ought to be a law …”

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In Malaty v. Malaty, the plaintiff Naguib Malaty sued his brother to compel the turnover of the defendant’s interest in a Brooklyn property that was supposedly purchased with plaintiff’s money, and for money damages in breach of conract and breach of fiduciary duty that the defendant purportedly owed to plaintiff’s two corporations.

Plaintiff had a few “minor” problems with his claim, however. First, he had no proof that his corporations were actually legitimate (based upon the evidence adduced at trial, the Court opined that these corporations for tax evasion purposes); Second, he had no written agreement memorializing the defendant’s agreement to transfer ownership of the subject property to plaintiff, as a result of which his claim was barred by New York’s Statute of Frauds.

In dismissing this branch of the plaintiff’s claim, the Court cited the underlying theory behind New York’s Statute of Frauds, which is over 100 years old:

“The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is sufficiently indicated by its title. It is a statute against frauds. It was designed to prevent litigation over oral agreements, where the terms are always dependent upon the uncertain and varying memory of witnesses. This evil was to be remedied by the reduction of the terms of the contract to writing, so that the parties might not misunderstand the particulars of the contract which they were making; that no one might be induced to enter a court of justice to vex the peace of his opponent without clear and definite evidence of the terms of the contract which formed the ground of action, equally accessible to both parties and to the court; and that perjury might not be invited to sustain a claim which never had any real existence.”

I find the irony in this decision amusing. The plaintiff figured that in attacking his brother’s integrity, no one would bother to question his own, and in so doing, lost sight of the fact that he could be setting himself up for an IRS audit and investigation.

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In a case that they brought in Federal Court in Upstate New York, Opto Generic Devices Inc. (“OGD”) sued Air Products & Chemicals Inc. (“ACC”) for breach of contract and for consequential damages, asserting that it lost profits when the defendant did not buy its products. In this case, the defendant admitted that the parties had entered into a series of agreements that delineated the scope of work to develop certain products for plaintiff, and included a $400,000 agreement for license rights to these products. In light of the ongoing working relationship between the parties, and the exchange of nearly $1,000,000 between them with regard to the development of this product, the plaintiff was caught off guard when the defendant never actually bought the finished product.

But the plaintiff had one “small” problem with their case – while the contract set forth the parties’ responsibilities as to patent prosecution and maintenance, commercial rights and licenses (i.e., it was a development contract), there was absolutely no provision requiring ACC to buy any OGD products. Consequently, I can’t say I’m surprised that the Court dismissed this aspect of their breach of contract action.

You know the old saying about what happens when you assume something …

It’s just another example of the costs of failing to reduce your agreements to writing.

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But assuming the truth of the allegations in his complaint, that’s exactly what happened to Richard Snyder, who claims that he and the defendant (who was an acquaintance) had orally agreed that they would work together as a joint venture, to acquire and operate companies in the media business.  Although the plaintiff would not put up any personal funds, he would “share in the proceeds on any consummated transaction” in exchange for his efforts to assemble deals for the joint venture.

In 2004, defendant and a group of other investors agreed to acquire Warner Music from Time Warner for approximately $2.6 billion in cash. According to the complaint, the plaintiff was a major factor to the closing of this deal: he identified the opportunity, persuaded defendant of its merits, and helped to get debt financing and obtained financial information from the target company.

One month after inviting Snyder to make an investment in the acquired company, which he did, to the tune of $1.3 million, the defendant (allegedly) told plaintiff “[T]here’s no room here for you at Warner’s” and refused plaintiff’s demand for “a lot of money” for plaintiff’s contribution to the transaction.

Unfortunately for the plaintiff, there was never any written agreement. And that proved fatal to his breach of contract (a/k/a “unjust enrichment” or “quantum meruit”) claim.

In affirming the dismissal of the claim in Snyder v. Bronfman, New York’s highest court cited General Obligations Law § 5-701 (a) (10), which says, in relevant part, as follows:

“Every agreement, promise or undertaking is void, unless it or some note or memorandum thereof be in writing, and subscribed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his lawful agent, if such agreement, promise or undertaking . . .

“Is a contract to pay compensation for services rendered in negotiating a loan, or in negotiating the purchase, sale, exchange, renting or leasing of any real estate or interest therein, or of a business opportunity, business, its good will, inventory, fixtures or an interest therein, including a majority of the voting stock interest in a corporation and including the creating of a partnership interest. ‘Negotiating’ includes procuring an introduction to a party to the transaction or assisting in the negotiation or consummation of the transaction. This provision shall apply to a contract implied in fact or in law to pay reasonable compensation . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

I guess the “Three Mistakes To Avoid When Negotiating A Small Business Deal” are as true as ever.

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In Robles v. Copstat Security, Inc., the plaintiffs brought a proposed class action on behalf of a class of all security guards employed by Copstat Security Inc. (Copstat Inc.), Copstat Security LLC, and Andrews International Inc. after the defendants allegedly failed to pay the plaintiffs’ earned overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and New York’s Minimum Wage Act.

Although the Court noted that the plaintiffs’ allegations in support of their claim that the corporate veil should be pierced were rather “general and vague” (suggesting that these claims may later be dismissed unless additional facts are fleshed out), the Court also refused to dismiss the claims against the individual defendant Bellistri at the initial pleading stage. The Court cited plaintiffs’ claim that the defendants’ corporate veil should be pierced because Bellistri, as the lone shareholder of Copstat, exercised complete domination and control over Copstat, and in that role, Bellistri left the company terribly undercapitalized when he unilaterally took nearly all of Copstat’s assets, and thereby left the corporate defendants unable to satisfy any adverse judgment.

From a practical standpoint, it remains to be seen what the plaintiffs gain by the denial of the individual defendant’s motion to dismiss, because unless the plaintiffs have, or later uncover, facts that support their contention that the corporate veil should be pierced, they may be merely prolonging the ultimate dismissal of these claims.

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Interestingly, for purposes of imposing liability under the CFAA, the Court noted that simply hitting the delete button will not suffice; citing a Seventh Circuit case, Int’l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d. 418 (7th Cir. 2006),  “merely pressing the delete key on a computer does not remove data but rather ‘removes the index entry and pointers to the data file so that the file appears no longer to be there.” Id. “Such deleted files,” wrote the Court, “are easily recoverable.” Id.

The Court continued, “Even though pressing the delete key technically ‘transmits a command’ to the computer,” it would render the statute (which, as stated above also carries criminal implications) too broad.  On the other hand, where, as in this case, the defendant allegedly used a secure-erasure program, such actions would fall within the ambit of the CFAA.

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Admittedly, it is hard to argue with his assertion that is a danger of excessive regulation which will hamper the banks’ abilities to start lending again, particularly to small businesses. On the other hand, and ironically, Professor George’s own hand lends substantial credence to the argument that the Wall Street culture remains seriously and fundamentally flawed. In particular, he notes that the boards of AIG and Wells Fargo voted to increase their executives’ pay to “unprecedented levels” to offset proposed legislation that would limit their bonuses.

Maybe I’m missing something, but I don’t understand why the bankers feel that they have some G-d-given “right” to high (read: obscenely high) compensation – regardless of the performance of their clients’ investments and retirement accounts; this is a phenomenon that simply does not exist in any other industry. In my view, so long as they don’t face any personal risk, financial or otherwise,  for their actions, they are unlikely to own up to their fiduciary responsibilities to their clients – the general public.

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