I get asked this question a fair amount, although it is rare that the person asking the question calls this doctrine by its formal, legal name. (Usually, it is more along the lines of “Didn’t they forfeit their right to complain …”). As you can probably surmise, waiver most often comes up in the context of a breach of contract claim, with party A contending that the other didn’t strictly abide by the written agreement’s terms, and party B claiming that both parties had been ignoring to a significant extent those strict contractual terms, and therefore, party A effectively waived its right to complain at this juncture.

In any event, New York’s courts have long held that “The essence of a waiver is an ‘intentional relinquishment of a known right.’” As a result, New York’s highest State court stated that “waiver requires a strong and clear showing of intent to waive.^‘”

Importantly, New York’s courts have also held that one party’s silence cannot create a waiver, because clear, affirmative action is needed; waiver cannot be effectuated by an ambiguous statement.

In short, as you might well imagine, waiver is far from easy to prove in New York.

Post Footer automatically generated by Add Post Footer Plugin for wordpress.

As a corollary to our blog article “When You Can Incur Personal Liability for a Debt in New York,” the question arises as to what New York’s courts will do when a claimant tries to hold a corporate officer personally liable in either breach of contract or fraud.

To that end, in a November 18 decision in Liang v. Sollecito, a Civil Court in New York County held that “The officers of a corporation may be held personally liable for torts committed on behalf of the corporation, but cannot be held personally liable on contracts provided that they did not bind themselves individually.” Thus, where there are no allegations that the officer had any direct involvement in the contract, or that he personally made any fraudulent misrepresentations with regard to the contract, then the complaint should be dismissed – even before formal discovery begins.

Which is precisely what happened in Liang.

And this should come as no surprise; After all, how often do you think corporate officers stick out their necks to render themselves personally liable? Even more challenging, of those times that it may have actually occurred, how easy do you think it will be to prove it?

Post Footer automatically generated by Add Post Footer Plugin for wordpress.

I find it sad when people learn a lesson the hard way.

On the other hand, I understand why the Court, and the New York Legislature set up the rules in this fashion: simply put, if they allowed unlicensed contractors to still get paid for work that requires a license, then that would effectively abrogate the need for the license altogether.

And that’s precisely what happened in Enko Construction Corp. v. Aronshtein. In this Nassau County case, the plaintiff construction company sought payment of monies owed for the home improvement work it did, but wasn’t paid for, in either breach of contract or quasi-contract (i.e., the reasonable value of the services they rendered on equitable grounds, which is also referred to as “unjust enrichment” or “quantum meruit“). There was one “small” problem with its claim, though:  the plaintiff wasn’t licensed to do home improvement.

Thus, in dismissing the complaint, the Court held as follows:

“It is well settled that a home improvement contractor who is unlicensed at the time of the performance of the work for which he or she seeks compensation forfeits the right to recover damages based on either breach of contract or quantum meruit. B & F Bldg. Corp. V. Liebig, 76 N.Y.2d 689 (1990); Flax v. Hommel, 40 A.D.3d 809 (2nd Dept. 2007).”

Post Footer automatically generated by Add Post Footer Plugin for wordpress.

I was recently contacted by a man who was dealt with unfairly by a much larger company he was trying to do business with. The bigger company, on a whim, decided that they didn’t want to do business with him anymore, so they came up with every reason they could muster – some legitimate, some not – to deem this poor guy in breach of contract.

The guy is intent on suing the big, bad company for breach of contract in a New York court; he is adamant that he doesn’t want to go to arbitration as called for in their agreement because he is convinced he won’t get a fair shake at arbitration (not to mention that it will prove rather expensive for him).

There’s one problem, however: as noted in an earlier article of mine,  it’s very difficult to invalidate a mandatory arbitration clause in New York. Even though he wanted to cast his claim as a business tort, as distinct from a straight breach of contract claim, I pointed out to him that if his attempt to circumvent the arbitration clause could be undone that easily, then mandatory arbitration clauses would be rendered virtually meaningless.

Post Footer automatically generated by Add Post Footer Plugin for wordpress.

If the unsubstantiated claims of this plaintiff are actually true, then I feel bad for the plaintiff.

But, as noted by the Court, therein lies the problem: the allegations are unsubstantiated.

In Lecce Penn Co. SPA v. Adrenaline Marketing & Promotions, Inc., the plaintiff sued in breach of contract and fraud to recover over $300,000 that they were purportedly owed. Fair enough.

But the plaintiff took it a step further: they tried to sue one of the shareholders of the defendant corporation personally.  Unfortunately for the plaintiff, they had no competent proof that this individual did anything that should have resulted in his being held personally liable for the corporate debt; in fact, the plaintiff did not even allege that he did anything that should have entitled them to pierce the corporate veil.

The thing that troubles me about this case is simply this: while I can understand that there are instances where the proof you expected to become available to support your claim doesn’t materialize, I don’t understand how the complaint itself can even fail to have any of the requisite allegations to support a claim seeking to pierce the corporate veil. That’s just poor draftsmanship.

Post Footer automatically generated by Add Post Footer Plugin for wordpress.

If you read my previous blog post, “How a Demotion Can Be Deemed a Breach of Employment Agreement Under NY Law,” you are probably wondering (or should be) the following: let’s assume a fact finder (i.e., whether a judge or jury) finds that my employer breached my employment agreement. What damages can I reasonably expect to recover under New York law?

As you might expect, the answer is a little bit complicated, and the determination of the right measure of damages is inherently fact-specific. That said, here are some of the major principles at play:

First, and as a threshold matter, the employee is entitled to recover the amount of salary and other benefits that (he, she) would have received under the contract – and here’s the important caveat – less certain deductions. (It’s the “fine print that always gets you, isn’t it.)

Those deductions allow the employer a set-off of those amounts that the employee, using his/her best efforts, either earned, or should have earned from other employment since the date that the agreement was ended. However, on this point the defendant bears burden of proving the amount the plaintiff could – or should – have earned through diligent efforts.

Additionally, although the newly-discharged employee is required to try to find similar employment, that does not mean that he/she is barred from starting his/her own business.  It is just that the damages will still be reduced by what plaintiff can reasonably be expected to earn from the venture during the unexpired term of the contract, Cornell v T. V. Development Corp., 17 NY2d 69, 268 NYS2d 29, 215 NE2d 349.

One final point is in order here: the expenses that were necessarily incurred by the employee in the course of seeking new gainful employment are recoverable – provided that the employee has conducted the job search in good faith, and with reasonable prudence, and skill.

Post Footer automatically generated by Add Post Footer Plugin for wordpress.

In a June 15 decision in Callisto Pharm. Inc. v. Picker, New York’s Appellate Division, First Department affirmed the trial court’s ruling that dismissed the plaintiff’s claims that its employee was secretly negotiating with their business partner, and therefore liable in breach of contract, fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. In addition, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had wrongfully taken their property, and was therefore liable in conversion.

Reading this decision, I can’t say I’m surprised; simply put, the plaintiff had absolutely no proof to support its claims other than rank speculation.

As the Appellate Court stated:

“This argument has no support in the record, which indicates that Tapestry approached defendant about joining its company after plaintiff rejected the partnership proposal. There is no evidence, other than plaintiff’s speculation, that defendant was negotiating during the two companies’ ultimately fruitless discussions (see Abrahami v UPC Constr. Co., 224 AD2d 231, 233 [1996] [fraud must be proven by clear and convincing evidence; "loose, equivocal or contradictory" evidence will not suffice] …

“The court properly dismissed the claim alleging that defendant acted as a faithless employee because there is no evidence that defendant was negotiating for his new position with Tapestry during the pendency of the business discussions between Tapestry and plaintiff. Nor is there any support for plaintiff’s contention that defendant was making use of confidential information while negotiating his employment with Tapestry.”

In fact, after reading this decision, and given how emphatic the appellate court’s opinion is, I can’t help but wonder: why did the plaintiff even bother appealing (or even bringing the claim in the first instance)?

Post Footer automatically generated by Add Post Footer Plugin for wordpress.

When your contract has been breached, your first reaction might very well be to bring a lawsuit in State or Federal Court. But that course of action may not be available, particularly if your written contract contains a clause mandating that all disputes be resolved by arbitration.

So, you ask, under what circumstances are those clauses enforceable?

Well, first, and as a threshold matter, the question as to whether the parties agreed to arbitrate should be decided by a court, not an arbitrator. That said, and while “a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit” Merrill Lynch Inv. Managers v. Optibase, Ltd., 337 F.3d 125, 131 (2d Cir.2003) (per curium), the preference for arbitration is so strong that, “under the FAA, ‘any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.’ “ JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 171 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983)).

So, what are the factors that a court looks to in deciding whether a case must go to arbitration?

The longstanding rule in New York is as follows:

“In deciding whether any part of an action should be directed to arbitration, [the] Court must determine: (i) whether the parties had an agreement to arbitrate; (ii) the scope of that agreement; (iii) if federal statutory claims are asserted, whether Congress intended those claims to be non-arbitrable; and (iv) if some, but not all, of the claims are subject to arbitration, whether to stay the balance of the proceedings pending arbitration. See JLM Indus., 387 F.3d at 169; Oldroyd v. Elmira Sav. Bank, FSB, 134 F.3d 72, 75-76 (2d Cir.1998).”

Post Footer automatically generated by Add Post Footer Plugin for wordpress.

Although, in the legal world, you can generally pursue different theories – even if they are inherently at odds with each other – to try and recover your losses, there are some exceptions to that rule. And the realm of breach of contract – at least in New York – is precisely one circumstances. You simply must ascertain whether your claim is based upon the breach of a valid written contract, or whether your claim is grounded in quasi-contract, i.e., to seek recovery on an strictly equitable basis.

In Fwan Management Co., LLC v. 420 West Broadway Corp., a New York County trial court dismissed the unjust enrichment claims of a shareholder in a real estate cooperative and proprietary lessee of commercial property space’s claims that he had been overcharged by the landlord. And the reason that his claims were dismissed, as noted in my earlier blog post, “What You Can Do Under NY Law if You Don’t Have a Valid Contract,” was based upon a straightforward application of New York law:

“Generally, an enforceable written contract precludes recovery in quasi contract with respect to events arising from the same subject matter. See Curtis Properties Corp. v. Greif Companies, 236 AD2d 237, 239 (1st Dep’t 1997). An unjust enrichment cause of action is ‘precluded by the fact that a simple breach of contract claim may not be considered a tort unless a legal duty independent of the contract-i.e., one arising out of circumstances extraneous to, and not constituting elements of, the contract itself-has been violated.’ Brown v. Brown, 12 AD3d 176, 176 (1st Dep’t 2004). However, a plaintiff may proceed on both breach of contract and quasi-contract theories where there is a genuine dispute as to the existence of a contract. Id

Since, in this case, there was no question that the issues were governed by express contractual language, the plaintiff’s unjust enrichment (i.e., “quasi-contract”) claims were correctly dismissed.

Post Footer automatically generated by Add Post Footer Plugin for wordpress.

Although you might think that the answer to this question is really simple – it’s when both sides have a fully signed agreement – you’d be terribly mistaken.

So, here’s the rule, as recently summarized by a New York County trial court:

“The requirements for formation of an enforceable contract are:

(1) at least two parties with legal capacity to contract;

(2) mutual assent to the terms of an agreement with reasonably certain terms; and,

(3) consideration (i.e., payment).

(4 NY Prac., Com. Litig. in New York State Courts § 59:12 [2d ed.], quoting Cobble Hill Nursing Home, Inc. v Henry and Warren Corp., 74 NY2d 475, 482 [1989]).

But what on earth does that mean?

The first prong is relatively straightforward: I can’t sell you a property that I don’t own, nor can I sell you that property if I lack the mental capacity to make the sale (no jokes, please).

The second prong means that both parties reach a “meeting of the minds,” i.e., they both understand what their respective obligations are, and agree to do it. As a practical and legal matter, this is referred to as an “offer and acceptance,” both of which must be clearly made. Importantly, New York’s courts have long held that “assent may be implied when a party has conducted himself in such a manner that his assent may fairly be inferred.”

The  upshot is this: if there is a clear offer by one side, and the other party to the purported agreement starts acting on it in a way that clearly demonstrates their belief that there is an agreement, then guess what?

You’ve got an enforceable contract under New York law.

Post Footer automatically generated by Add Post Footer Plugin for wordpress.