“A restraint is reasonable only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public … A non-compete agreement must also be reasonably limited temporally and geographically.”

Well, that’s awfully vague, you say. And you’re right. Fortunately, the Court gave us a clearer insight into the policy considerations that help determine whether a particular non-compete provision will be upheld:

“Undoubtedly judicial disfavor of these covenants is provoked by ‘powerful considerations of public policy which militate against sanctioning the loss of a man’s livelihood’ …

“Indeed, our economy is premised on the competition engendered by the uninhibited flow of services, talent and ideas. Therefore, no restrictions should fetter an employee’s right to apply to his own best advantage the skills and knowledge acquired by the overall experience of his previous employment. This includes those techniques which are but ‘skillful variations of general processes known to the particular trade.’

“Of course, the courts must also recognize the legitimate interest an employer has in safeguarding that which has made his business successful and to protect himself against deliberate surreptitious commercial piracy.”

So where does that leave us?

Here’s the Court’s conclusion:

“Restrictive covenants will be enforceable to the extent necessary to prevent the disclosure or use of trade secrets or confidential customer information.”

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Absolutely not, held a New York County trial court.

In Nichols v. SG Partners, Inc., the plaintiffs were employed by defendant as placement professionals, earning both a base salary as well as a percentage of defendant’s revenues generated for placements that the plaintiffs made, or commissions. After the plaintiffs found the working conditions “intolerable,” they resigned, and requested that the defendant pay them for the commissions they had earned during their employment. Not surprisingly, the defendant ignored these requests.

Accordingly, the plaintiffs sued the defendants, contending that the defendants were liable for breach of contract, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment and violation of New York Labor Law (“Labor Law”) §193. The defendant then promptly moved to dismiss the case, arguing, among other things, that since the plaintiffs did not have a written contract the plaintiffs’ claims were barred under New York’s Statute of Frauds (N.Y. Gen. Obl. Law §5-701).

In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the Court cited a long litany of precedent for the proposition that “[B]ecause an at-will employment relationship may be freely terminated by either party at any time for any reason or even no reason, employment agreements of this type generally do not fall under the proscription of the Statute of Frauds.”

Importantly, the Court also noted that if it is later found at trial that an employer willfully withheld the plaintiffs’ wages, in derogation of Labor Law §198.1-a, “an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to twenty-five percent of the total amount of the wages found to be due” (Rasmussen v. Yellow River, Inc. 298 AD2d 322 [1st Dept 2002]; Wolintetz v. Island Stationary Corp., 16 Misc 3d 1133 [NY Dist Ct 2007] (withholding of payment of commissions was a willful act of retaliation for the plaintiff’s leaving the defendant’s employ)).

The message to employers is unmistakably clear: if you wrongfully withhold earned wages or payments due to your former employees, you do so at your own peril.

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“Once the commission is earned, it cannot be forfeited (see Davidson v. Regan Fund Mgt. Ltd., 13 AD3d 117 [2004];⁴ Yudell, 248 AD2d 189, supra). There is a long-standing policy against the forfeiture of earned wages, and this applies to earned, uncollected commissions as well (Weiner v. Diebold Group, Inc., 166, 166-167[1991]) …”

On the other hand, “although generally an at-will employee is not entitled to post-termination commissions, the parties are certainly free to provide otherwise in a written agreement.”

There is another important rule to consider, however. And that is the doctrine of contra proferentem, which states that an employment agreement should be construed against the drafter.  In this case, the Court held that had Management “meant to foreclose the possibility that plaintiff might earn a post-termination commission on a placement” arranged by plaintiff, it “could have said so explicitly.” And this they clearly failed to do.

The moral of the story is obvious: be very, very careful in drafting your employment agreements.

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In seeking to recover damages for breach of contract and wrongful termination, the plaintiff asserted that he had an implied contract of employment (rather than being a mere “at will” employee) because he had been assured “that [d]efendants would operate the firm, and that [p]laintiff would be permitted to perform his job responsibilities, in accordance with the prevailing laws, rules and regulation of the securities profession.” In a similar vein, he claimed that since the defendants had made clear that he would be terminated for violating any laws, the defendants thereby impliedly warranted that they would not fire him for upholding those same laws.

As you may have guessed, these arguments didn’t even make it out of the starting gate; the Court dismissed the complaint without even requiring the defendants to answer the complaint.

And the reason the Court did so is straightforward: not only did the plaintiff fail to overcome the presumption of employment at will, the plaintiff did not produce any writing that limited the defendant’s right to hire, fire, promote, demote, transfer or take any other employment action it deemed otherwise appropriate.

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In this case, the plaintiff, a former assistant treasurer of the defendant bank, claimed that she was fired as a direct result of her attempts to expose suspicious irregularities with respect to several trade confirmations that had come to her attention. Although she acknowledged that she was an at-will (as opposed to a contract) employee (for more information on the limited rights of at-will employees under New York law, see “Why Most Breach of Contract/Wrongful Termination Claims By At-Will Employees Are Doomed To Fail“), she alleged that the defendant’s own “Personnel Policies and Practices Manual promised to protect her from adverse action in connection with reporting suspicious activities,” and that this promise gave rise to a contractual obligation to protect her from retaliatory termination.

According to the Court, there are two problems that prove fatal to her claim, however. First, the Manual only protected against retaliatory action those who file a Suspicious Activities Report (SAR) – which the plaintiff never did. Second, the Manual also contained an explicit disclaimer that allowed them to terminate any at-will employee.

Thus, the implication of this decision is two-fold:

1. If you are an employee, make sure you read carefully your employment manual before you undertake any actions that might affect your job; and,
2. If you are the employer, make sure that your employment manual is appropriately drafted to protect your right to terminate at-will employees.

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But assuming you clear that first hurdle, there is a second question that may prove even more daunting: Did you have a contract, or were you an “at-will” employee? And the answer to this question is critical, because absent a written contract, the agreement “is presumed to be a hiring at will that may be freely terminated by either party at any time for any reason or even for no reason. Lobosco v. New York Telephone Co./NYNEX, 96 NY2d 312, 316 (2001). Furthermore, there is no exception for firings that violate public policy such as, for example, discharge for exposing an employer’s illegal activities, UNLESS the employee made its employer aware of an express written policy limiting the right of discharge and the employee detrimentally relied on that policy in accepting employment. See,  Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 57 NY2d 458 (1982).

As you might well surmise, this condition is rare indeed.

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